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DAVID P. VALENTI*

Currency Unification in the European
Economic Community: The Mechanics,

Politics, and Probability for Success
The Bretton-Woods Agreement of the 1950s was the first modem attempt
to stabilize European currencies versus each other on a long-term basis.' The
agreement was limited to minimizing changes in exchange rates on foreign exchange markets between a small number of European countries, far fewer than
the European Economic Community (EEC) comprises.2 The agreement lasted
for nearly twenty years and was moderately successful in achieving its goal of
stabilization. 3 However, due to its limited scope, the agreement was inevitably
doomed to failure as countries' individual priorities took precedence over the
EEC-oriented goal of the agreement, namely exchange-rate stabilization. 4 Increased inflation and other economic pressures during the late 1960s and early
1970s led the agreement's original participants (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) to abandon the constraints of the global
policies set forth in the agreement in favor of policies that would improve their
individual economies.5 The abandonment of the Bretton-Woods agreement led
to wild fluctuations in exchange rates among many European countries and to
uncertainty in European capital and goods markets. 6 The failure of the BrettonNote: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*J.D. Candidate, 1995, Southern Methodist University. Citations Editor, Southern Methodist

University School of Law Student Editorial Board, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
1. Aurthur I. Bloomfield, HistoricalSetting, in EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS
MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 22-23 (Lawrence B. Krause & Walter S. Salant eds., 1973).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Susan B. Shulman, A Rapid or EvolutionaryApproach: The EEC'sAdoption of the ECUas
a Common Currency, 12 J. INT'L L. Bus. 392 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 23.
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Woods Agreement also helped to usher in a period of soaring inflation and economic hardship throughout Europe. 7
The current effort to stabilize markets and exchange rates in Europe, called
the European Monetary System (EMS), is based in part on what the EEC learned
from the successes and failures of the Bretton-Woods Agreement. 8 Yet, the current
endeavor by the EEC is far more comprehensive than the Bretton-Woods
Agreement because it includes objectives in fiscal and monetary policy coordination as well as currency stabilization. 9 The members of the EEC recognized that
one of the major flaws in the Bretton-Woods system was the lack of political
and fiscal coordination.O Therefore, the EEC members also established the goals
of creating fiscal, monetary, and political unification throughout the entire EEC
region."' In addition to other differences, the current plan envisions the EMS as
promoting not simply currency stabilization, which was the primary goal of the
Bretton-Woods Agreement, but currency unification. 2
A key feature of the EMS is the proposed establishment of a common currency
for intra-EEC transactions that could eventually become a currency suitable for
international trade. 3 The current candidate for use as the sole currency throughout
the EEC is the European Currency Unit (ECU).' 4 The basic premise of and
problems facing the ECU are similar to those of the Bretton-Woods system."
The problems include the tendency for countries to abandon their agreements
during times of hardship in favor of policies supporting their own nationalistic
interests.1 6 The success the EEC achieves in overcoming such problems will
ultimately determine the success or failure of the EMS.' 7 The EEC may have
already overcome one of its larger hurdles to achieving currency unification
through recognition by the Member States that lasting economic stability throughout the region requires fiscal, monetary, and political uniformity and not simply
currency stability.' 8
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate how the technicalities of creating a single currency are simple compared to the political complexities, and why,

7. Id.
8. Lawrence B. Krause, Implicationsfor Private Capital Markets, in EUROPEAN MONETARY
UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 114-15.
9. Id. at 115.
10. Shulman, supra note 4, at 407.
11. Krause, supra note 1, at 115.
12. Id.
13. HORST UNGERER ET AL., THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM: DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES

2-3 (1990).

14. See generally OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL
ECU (1984) [hereinafter THE ECU].

PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE

15. MICHELE FRATIANNI & JURGEN VON HAGEN, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM AND

(1992).
16, Id.
17. See generally Bloomfield, supra note 1.
18. Krause, supra note 1, at 115.
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in the end, the political problems are likely to forestall any real progress towards
currency unification. Part I discusses some potential effects of currency unification, including an overview of the EMS. Part II looks at the place of the ECU
within the EMS and the progress the EMS has achieved toward currency unification. Part III evaluates the possibility of the successful introduction of a unified
currency within the EMS.
I. What Could Currency Unification Mean Within the EMS?
A. A

HYPOTHESIS

Just when the world thought that the latest series of corporate layoffs was
ending, here they come again. Only this time they will likely be longer and more
drastic then ever before. Europe, which once looked to be one of the world's
most promising growth markets of the 1990s, has suddenly taken a turn for the
worse. Europe is pitched in a deep recession with runaway inflation and pervasive
high unemployment throughout the entire region. The prospect of 2 percent gross
domestic product (GDP) growth in the United States, once thought to be stagnant,
leads the world. Indeed, economists are predicting that Europe's GDP may even
be shrinking in the face of overwhelming problems. High inflation in many
European countries has led to sharp increases in unemployment throughout the
region and a drastic reduction of disposable income for most Europeans.
The only difference between this slowdown in the European economy and
similar slowdowns of the past is that the governments of Europe have lost the
ability to control the situation. The result in the United States is much the same
as it is in Europe. A reduction in personal income has precipitated a corresponding
decrease in demand for products produced in the United States. The U.S. economy
is experiencing a dramatic slowdown, an increase in the inflation rate in order
to compensate for the lost profits, wages, and taxes, and high interest rates that
harken back to the 1970s. The United States is also facing a new onslaught of
corporate down-sizings.
The European governments precipitated this loss of control by relinquishing
the major policy tools that had previously been available to them to correct these
problems. 19 No longer can an EEC member government use fiscal or monetary
policy to help slow down inflation or decrease unemployment. 2 ° That power has
been reserved for a central authority responsible for setting economic policy for
the entire EEC. 21 Everything from setting interest rates to printing money is
22
controlled, not by each country, but by the European Central Bank (ECB).

19. Marc Dassesse, Selected Aspects of European Economic Community Law on Investments
and Acquisitions in Europe, 25 INT'L LAW. 375, 389-90 (1991).
20. Shulman, supra note 4, at 409.
21. Id. at 410.
22. Id.
WINTER 1994
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Individual governments can no longer determine what the best economic course
may be for their nations, but rather must live with decisions made by the ECB.
Unfortunately, the decisions that the bank has determined to be the best for the
region as a whole may not be in the best interest of any one particular country."
The result is that the separate policies that are in the best interest of each country
individually are subordinated to a unified, and consequently less efficient, policy.2 4 Governments have replaced precise management of economies at an individual country level with generalized policies suitable only for the "average" country
in an entire community of states.25 The ECB policy control is tantamount to a
surgeon operating with a jackhammer or a musician playing the piano while
wearing mittens.
This situation sounds like a plausible and even familiar illustration of governmental bureaucracy in action. Yet, it is possible that an entire community of
countries could be making such a major strategic blunder. This devastation is a
likely result of the move toward currency unification and a fully integrated EMS
in the EEC.26 When the national currencies of the EEC member countries are
eliminated and a single currency takes over, the resulting loss of control by EEC
members over their fiscal and economic policies is likely to cause the type of
uncontrollable inflation and reduced demand that could send European and other
world economies into a tailspin and result in another prolonged and deep recession, or even another depression.27 This loss of policy control will lead to the
exporting of inflation and unemployment throughout the EEC like that seen when
the Black Plague descended upon Europe in the Middle Ages.2" If such terrible
destruction is a possible result of the adoption of a unified currency in Europe,
the important consideration becomes how likely is it that currency unification
will happen.
B.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE

EMS

The foregoing hypothesis predicting the economic destruction of the world
was predicated on the assumption that the EMS was fully operational and that
currency unification had taken place. The situation presented was one in which
the governments of the EEC countries had little ability to influence the economic
world on their own. The discussion now turns to what might motivate a logical
government, knowing the potentially disastrous effects of unification, to get involved in such a plan.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Dassesse, supra note 19, at 390.
Id.
Shulman, supra note 4, at 411.
W. Max Corden, The Adjustment Problem, in EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS
MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 177.
27. Id.
28. JACQUES VAN YPERSELE & JEAN-CLAUDE KOEUNE, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM:
ORIGINS, OPERATIONS AND OUTLOOK 61 (1984).
VOL. 28, NO. 4
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The answer may be as simple as human nature. At some point in time, some
unknown person had the idea that a Europe unified by currency would be better
off than one divided.2 9 And while that idea may have been valid in the past, it
does not necessarily hold true today. However, human nature can lead the authors
of a concept to feel obligated to accomplish it no matter how the situation has
changed since the idea was first conceived.
Certainly, economic cooperation is not a newly conceived idea within Europe.°
Even before the Bretton-Woods Agreement of the early 1950s Europeans were
striving to make trade simpler throughout the region. 3 Indeed, the European
effort is quite understandable considering, for example, how difficult it would
be to move throughout the United States if it were necessary to exchange currency
upon entering a new state. Imagine trying to conduct interstate business knowing
that you must have fifty different currencies available at all times. Businesses
could end up spending more time trying to keep straight the exchange rates
between all of the states than in trying to sell their products.
While other avenues for monetary cooperation are available, such as reserve
pooling and reciprocal lines of credit, the EEC settled on monetary unification
as its goal. 32 The current attempt to achieve currency stability, the EMS, is not
the first to be attempted by European governments.33 In 1957 the Treaty of
Rome was signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands and was ratified by all six states by January of 1958. 34 The treaty
provided detailed provisions and timetables for the creation of a customs union
and the removal of barriers to movement of capital within the participating countries. 35 In addition, the aforementioned Bretton-Woods Agreement of the 1950s
was an attempt to fix exchange rates in an effort to stabilize certain European
currencies. 36 During the period that the Bretton-Woods Agreement was in effect,
from 1957 until 1972, little meaningful progress occurred toward monetary and
economic policy coordination. 37 This lack of progress resulted in the divergence

29. Harry G. Johnson, Narrowing the Exchange Rate Bands, in EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 79.
30. See generally Bloomfield, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. Johnson, supra note 1, at 79.
33. Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 22.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Shulman, supra note 4, at 392. According to Shulman the ECU had many predecessors.
The European Payment Union set up the first unit of account in 1950. This unit was valued in gold,
and had the same weight in gold as the U.S. dollar. The unit could be converted into national currencies
based upon the Member States' fixed exchange rates under the Bretton-Woods Agreement. The
degeneration of fixed exchange rates led to experimentation with many different units of accounts
within the Community. Most notably, in 1972 the EEC adopted the "snake." The "snake" permitted
exchange rate fluctuations of +/-2.25% against the U.S. dollar and +/-4.5% between any two
Community currencies. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
37. Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 22-23.
WINTER 1994
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of inflation rates and economic trends among the participating countries. 38 The
lack of coordination also led to a series of crises in the balance-of-payments
between the EEC Member States.39
In March of 1972, in an effort to correct the problems caused by the recent
de facto abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system, the EEC governments
made the first moves toward the creation of an informal mechanism for coordination of monetary policy, which they referred to as the "snake. "4 The "snake"
only managed to achieve moderate success in stabilizing exchange rates within
the EEC. 41 The main impediment to greater success of the "snake" was its lack
of two items: (1) policy coordination (both fiscal and monetary) and (2) the
financing necessary to implement exchange-rate intervention.42
In 1970, in an effort to strengthen the monetary union that the Bretton-Woods
Agreement had begun, the Werner Report explicitly set out the implications of
monetary union. 43 In addition, where the Bretton-Woods Agreement left many
aspects of economic policy ambiguous, the creators of the Werner Plan left no
ambiguity about the desirability of freedom of private capital movements within
the region. 4 The report "envisions a situation in which 'policy harmonization
and coordination' will eliminate speculative capital movements and avoid ...
problems" caused by restricted movement of capital.45
Where the Bretton-Woods Agreement was limited to exchange-rate stability,
the EEC, through the Werner Report, recognized that in order to establish an
effective economic and monetary union, the free movement of capital between
Member States was essential to the agreement.46 The Werner Report viewed the
free movement of capital within the EEC as not only advancing economic welfare,
but as essential to the formation and maintenance of an effective economic and
monetary union.47 In 1979, recognizing that the creation of a monetary union is
more complex than the simple mechanics of creating a single currency, the EEC

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Stephen Zamora, Introductionto Resolution of the European Council of the Establishmentof
the EuropeanMonetary System (EMS) and Related Matters,in BAsIc DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW

457 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Krause, supra note 1, at 114. The report called for three main items: (1) total currency
convertibility, (2) elimination of exchange rate fluctuations, and (3) the fixing of parity ratios. Id.
at 114-15.
44. Id. at 115. "One should not take the mistaken view that the Werner group was unaware of
the problems that private capital movements may cause for governments; indeed, the report points
to the enormous growth in speculation as an argument for monetary union." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 116.
47. Id.
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developed the EMS. 48 At first, some members of the EEC did not receive the
concept of the EMS positively. 49 The majority of economists predicted an inevitable and most likely quick departure for the agreement. 50
The EEC has operated under the EMS for fourteen years and the EMS has
achieved some moderate success. 5 The EMS has already gone through at least
three distinct phases of development since its inception. 2 The first phase lasted3
from the beginning of the EMS in 1979 until approximately March of 1983.1
"During those early years the ECU ... failed to gain the importance that had
been widely hoped for. It did not play a major role either as a reserve asset or
as a means of settlement of intervention debts." 54 This failure occurred notwithstanding the fact that the ECU was a key feature of the EMS. 55 The second phase
began in March 1983 and continued into 1987.56 In a drastic change of policy,
the French Government led the way by abandoning their expansionary policies
and by accepting a significant drop in the central rate of the French franc with
respect to most other EEC currencies.5 7 "The emergence of a common economic
policy approach had its corollary in the operational field. The Deutsche Mark,
as the currency with the most consistent record of stability among the major
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) currencies and in its role as reserve currency,
emerged as the 'anchor currency' of the EMS. "58 Since approximately September
1987, when the EMS signed the Basle/Nyborg agreement, the EMS has been
working through its third phase.5 9 The agreement marked the beginning of the

48. FRATIANNI, supra note 15, at 1. "The EMS followed several unsuccessful attempts to stabilize
exchange rates among the Community members. Its charter describes the goals of the EMS as
'a greater measure of monetary stability,' 'growth with stability,' and 'convergence of economic
development.' " Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52.

UNOERER,

supra note 13, at 2-3.

53. Id. at 2. This first phase was characterized by trial and orientation during which time the
member countries followed different economic policies in attempts to cope as best they could with
exogenous disturbances. Id. These policies acted many times in diverse and discordant ways. Id.
The differences in approach actually increased divergences in economic developments among the
EEC Member States. Id. "Several realignments-seven including the one in March 1983 . . .- took
place to compensate, at least in part, for price and cost differentials." Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally THE ECU, supra note 14.
56. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 2-3. This phase primarily consisted of economic pohiicy consolidation where the EEC Member States increasingly aligned their economic policies in an effort to begin
to create some level of monetary stability within the Community. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3. The third phase is typified by the reexamination of the monetary system and its
effects on individual Member States in an effort to generate more equitable results between the
members. Id.

WINTER 1994
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third phase and set out new rules for Member States' access to the so called very
short-term financing facility. 6°
The EEC's inclusion of elements of economic, monetary, and political union
within the EMS constitutes a clear recognition that more than exchange rate
stability is necessary for success of the EMS. 6 ' In comparison to the narrow goals
of the "snake" and the Bretton-Woods Agreement, the EEC created the EMS
to be a comprehensive system aimed at broader economic integration objectives.62
A likely reason for the notable successes of the EMS in weathering conflicts as
well as it has, and certainly better than the Bretton-Woods Agreement, is its
concentration on integration of all aspects of the monetary system.63
The EMS comprises three main operational elements. 64 The first is an exchange
rate mechanism backed by regulations strong enough to force Member States to
actively attempt to reduce fluctuations in exchange rates within the EEC. 65 The
second is a financing mechanism that provides the necessary short-term credit
to enable member countries to effect the required intervention in the foreign
exchange markets in order to reduce fluctuations. 66 The third encompasses regulations that entrench the ECU as the official reserve asset as well as the official
accounting unit for the EEC. 67
The EEC did not design the EMS to be an end in itself, but adopted the EMS
as a step on the road toward accomplishment of complete monetary union.68
Coordination of economic policy will be through the ECB. 6 9 The EEC set up
the ECB within the framework of the EMS agreement to control monetary policy,
including the setting of interest rates, throughout the EEC. 70 The actual shifting
of policy determination power to the ECB will not take place until the later stages
of the agreement, allowing time for adjustment on the part of EEC Member
States. 7' At the point of power shifting, the system of fixed exchange rates will

60. Id.
61. MICHAEL EMERSON & CHRISTOPHER HUNE, foreword to THE ECU REPORT 6 (1991).

62. UNGERER, supra note 13, at2. "Whereas the snake-notin its original intentions, as envisaged
in the Werner Plan, but in its actual realization after the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system
in 1973-was limited to being an exchange rate agreement, the EMS aimed at exchange rate stability
through the convergence of economic performance." Id.
63. Id.
64. Stephen Zamora, Introduction to Agreement of 13 March 1979 Between the Central Banks
of the Member States of the European Economic Community Laying Down the Operating Procedures
for the European Monetary System, in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra
note 40, at 471.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 472.
69. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 17.
70. Id.
71. Id.
VOL. 28, NO. 4
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disappear and the ECU will become the single currency used throughout the
EEC.72
The EEC's plan for economic, monetary, and political unions has the potential
of accomplishing far more than simply altering the balance of economic power
within the EEC and throughout the world.73 These unions have the potential to
effect the reshaping of Europe as fundamentally in the future as did the convention
of Vienna in 1815 and the Yalta summit in 1944.7' The agreements forged by
the EEC, if taken to their logical and intended conclusion, will shift some political
power from the Member States' governments in the EEC to a central body responsible for managing the region as a whole. 75 The Member States of the EEC clearly
demonstrated, by adopting a resolution at the meeting launching the EMS in
1978, that the ECU was to be the pillar of the EMS and was designed to be the
unified currency of the EEC. 76 The EEC also signaled an expectation for broad
unification within the EMS by providing within the 1978 agreement "for the
future consolidation of all existing credit mechanisms inside a European Monetary
77
Fund."
The exchange-rate mechanism, for which the ECU serves as the method of
settlement, includes an obligation on the part of participating central banks to
intervene in exchange-rate markets whenever a currency is at risk of crossing
its fluctuation limit relative to other currencies. 78 Implicit in this obligation is
the requirement that credit mechanisms exist to supply the funds necessary for
intervention in the foreign exchange markets. 79 Thus, the EMS has three primary
uses for the ECU within its context as a reserve asset: (1) very short-term financing, (2) short-term monetary support, and (3) medium-term financial assistance.80
As the founding members of the EMS recognized, the unified system will only
72. Id.

73.

EMERSON,

supra note 61, at 8.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. THE ECU, supra note 14, at 15. " 'A European currency unit (ECU) will be at the centre
of the EMS' . . . The Heads of State or Government wanted it to be seen 'as a fundamental component
of a more comprehensive strategy aimed at lasting growth with stability ......."Id.
77. VAN YPERSELE, supra note 28, at 61. The creation of the EMF by the EEC was to be part
of the EMS's institutional phase that has been plagued by delays from the beginning. Id. Prior to
the creation of the ECU as part of the EMS, the EEC created a common currency called the European
Monetary Unit of Account (EMUA) which primarily acted as an internal accounting unit between
Member States and nothing more. Id. at 48. The ECU, however, "is not simply an accounting unit,
and it has been assigned a more important role than the EMUA it has replaced." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. In turn, these credit mechanisms require rules and instruments for settlement if they are
to work properly and fairly. Id. The funds governments borrow in order to implement their intervention
efforts are denominated in ECUs; similarly, when the borrowing government settles its account and
pays back the loan, its payment is denominated in ECUs. Id.
80. Id. at 61. Very short-term financing is designed to aid Member States in intervening in
foreign exchange rate markets to maintain exchange rate stability within the prescribed ranges. Id.
The EMS designed short-term monetary support to help meet the financing requirements resulting
from temporary balance-of-payments deficits that differences in cycles between EEC Member States'
WINTER 1994
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work and last if there is significant convergence of not only currency but also
monetary and fiscal policies. 8' As the states participating in the Bretton-Woods
Agreement had experienced, a lack of policy and political coordination increases
the possibility that the good intentions of an agreement will readily give way to
the short-sighted proprietary goals of the individual governments. 82 At the outset
of the EMS, major divergences in economic situations between EEC Member
States existed, including wildly disparate inflation rates. 8 3 As an example, inflation rates at the formation of the EMS ranged from 2.7 percent in Germany to
12.2 percent in Italy. 84 Many of the principal objections to the EMS at that time
were based on the economic divergences between EMS members. 8' EMS critics
recognized three possible consequences of the divergences. 86 First, because of
its rigidity, the system would not be able to accommodate situations with such
great divergences and as a consequence might rapidly fail.87 Second, the system
might be able to continue for a time, but would lead to deflationary consequences
that would negatively impact employment either by forcing high-inflation countries to become more restrictive in their policies or by forcing all Member States
to suffer in competitiveness in order to support the weaker countries.8 8 Third,
severe inflationary consequences throughout the EEC could result because countries with a low rate of inflation would have to import inflation from the higher
inflation countries via price supports and increases in their monetary bases.89
In the end, unification will cause Member States to become more interdependent, trading more than ever with each other and forcing the adoption of unified
economic and fiscal policies so as to avoid the otherwise inevitable inflation
wars. 9° Because of increased interdependence within the EEC after currency
unification, fiscal policy will become more important to the individual states in
order to protect against unemployment and run-away inflation. 91 The need for
independent fiscal policy will become the chief paradox to the entire concept of
a unified currency and monetary system; unified fiscal policy is essential to the
economies can cause. Id. Finally, the EMS envisions using the ECU for medium-term financial
assistance "to any Member State that experiences difficulties or is seriously threatened by difficulties
with its balance of payments." Id. at 62.
81. Id.at 66.
82. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
83. VAN YPERSELE, supra note 28, at 66.
84. Id. The oil shock of the 1970s, which dramatically affected the United States, also served
to exacerbate the already huge spread in inflation rates present between the EEC Member States.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 72. At a minimum, coordination in fiscal policy will be necessary
any time that the ECU exchange rate or the EC current account or both are in need of correction.
Id.
91. Id.at 71.
VOL. 28, NO. 4
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success of any union, but independent fiscal policy is the most potent weapon
at the disposal of individual Member States' disposal for battling inflation and
unemployment. 92 This dichotomy will be one of the chief stumbling blocks toward
the accomplishment of lasting currency unification.93
II. The ECU
A.

THE MECHANICS OF CURRENCY UNIFICATION IN THE

EMS

Creating a monetary union requires more than merely accepting a single currency as the means of trade within a geographic region. 94 "A monetary union
has two essential components: exchange rate union and capital market integration." 95 The exchange rate union is the geographic area in which exchange rates
for the Member States' currencies are permanently fixed in relation to each
other. 96 The integrated capital market "is an area permanently without exchange97
controls for capital transactions, including interest and dividend payments."
In addition, the integrated capital market will most likely involve the harmonization of wages, taxes, and other measures that directly and indirectly affect the
capital market. 98 For true currency unification, all national currencies would
disappear, and a single currency would take over as the sole means of settlement,
both public and private, within the system. 99
Currency unification has several implications. First, a tourist could traverse
the entire region of the EEC, passing through country after country, without
ever having to exchange currency.l°° Second, business people could give price
quotes in one currency and be sure that exchange rates would not affect their
profit.' 0 1Third, consumers could directly compare prices for goods in two separate countries. 0 2 Fourth, a trader could take advantage of price differences between goods coming from different countries in order to make buy and sell
decisions more easily.'° 3 Fifth, bankers could lend and borrow throughout the
region with concern only for credit risk and not exchange-rate risk.'04 And sixth,
investors could build and invest where the cost was the least, knowing that the
92. See generally notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
93. Id.

94. W. Max Corden, The Adjustment Problem, in EUROPEAN
supra note 1, at 159.

MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS

MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES,

95.
96.
widely
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 159-60. The exchange rates of the currencies participating in the union may still vary
in relation to nonunion currencies. However, they will move in unison with each other. Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
EMERSON,

supra note 61, at 11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WINTER 1994
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marketability and cost competitiveness of exports would not be affected by exchange-rate shifts in the future.' 05 "In short, a single currency would transform
many economic relationships for the better.-106
In addition to the acceptance of a single currency for trade throughout the
EEC, at least two other actions are needed to forge a truly complete union: (1)
the EEC must pool the individual Member States' foreign exchange reserves,
and (2) monetary policy must be centrally controlled. 107 The system will work
only if the EEC Member States can sustain it. 0 8 Therefore, the stability of the
system would seem to be of paramount importance."0 The consequence of not
having a central bank independent of political control is that the public's expectation that politicians will boost the economy, and consequently inflation, might
become self-fulfilling, making it more difficult for the central bank to reduce
inflation. " 0 Eventually, these unavoidable political pressures are likely to force
the ultimate collapse of the system. "' Thus, full integration of the economies of
the EEC must be based on more than just a common currency. 112 The political
power to set fiscal and monetary policy must be fully integrated within an independent political body such as the ECB.113
The Delors Report is the premier work outlining a number of proposed policies
and goals of the EEC in creating the EMS. The report outlines three stages to
integration: (1) increased convergence of economic performance by strengthening
economic and monetary policy coordination within the current system, (2) a
transitional period when learning and progress towards collective decision makings are of paramount importance, and (3) a final move toward irrevocably locked
exchange rates that is designed to give way ultimately to a single currency (namely
the ECU). "' The report also emphasizes that parallel progression of economic

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Corden, supra note 1, at 161. If each Member State maintains the ability to set its own
monetary policy, then one country can run a balance-of-payments deficit by expanding credit, forcing
other countries to finance the deficit. Id. Thus, monetary policy must be centrally controlled, and
no country must be allowed to engage in this type of domestic credit creation. Id.
108. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 55.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 40-41. In the first stage, the focus on the economic field
"would center on the completion of the internal market and the reduction of existing regional
disparities. In the monetary field, the objective of a single financial area would be fully implemented." Id. In the second stage, the most important feature in the monetary field "would be
the setting up of the ESCB [European System of Central Banks], which would absorb previously
existing institutions..." Id. In the final stage, the effort in the economic field would concentrate
on "common structural and regional policies would be further strengthened, and rules in the
macroeconomic and budgetary field would become binding. The transition to a single monetary
policy would be made, and the ESCB would assume all its responsibilities." Id.
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and monetary policies among the Member States is of strategic importance. 15
The report proposes that instead of setting deadlines, the EEC should be free to
determine the beginning of new stages based upon the progress and success of
the previous stages.116
As outlined in the report and in the EEC agreement, the current formation of
the ECU is a basket of currencies in which each participating'member's currency
comprises a share of the total value of the ECU. 17
' The value and composition
of the ECU when set up was identical to its predecessor, the EMUA, which also
consisted of a basket of currencies but of a much smaller group of countries."' 8
"The currencies of the 12 countries participating in the EMS are counted in the
basket of currencies that make up the European Currency Unit (ECU). . . . These
same 12 governments have deposited gold and dollar assets with the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMF) in exchange for an equivalent amount of
ECUs. "19 In addition, "EC leaders reached a consensus (with reservations by
U.K. Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher) on a three-stage approach leading
to full monetary union." 12 The EEC determined the respective weights of the
participating currencies based on the GDP of each country and the countries'
participation in the external trade of the EEC.' 2
By the inclusion of all Member States' currencies, the EEC intended to demonstrate the importance of the ECU as more than a simple technical unit. 122 If the
ECU were intended to be a mere technical unit, the EEC would have more
appropriately limited the unit to only a few currencies so that its value could be
easily calculable. 2 3 Normally, the EMS commission responsible for the basket
composition will only reexamine the value every five years.' 24 However, any
Member State may request re-examination of the basket if the weight of any
currency has changed by 25 percent or more during the period since the previous
examination.125 Revisions of the basket must be accepted by all EEC Member
States. 26 Because of the recent strength of the German economy, the Deutsche
115.
116.
117.
118.
(EMS)

Id.at 40.
Id.
THE ECU, supra note 14, at 9.
Resolution of the European Council on the Establishment of the European Monetary System
and Related Matters, compiled in MONETARY COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNITY MONETARY TEXTS § 2.1 (1986) [hereinafter Resolution of the European
Council].
119. Zamora, supra note 40, at 458-59.
120. Id. at 459. These reservations are important in the discussion of the potential political pitfalls
that are pervasive in the current agreement because they are symptomatic of the underlying inadequacies of the entire concept of a unified currency. Id.
121. THE ECU, supra note 14, at 9.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id.; see Resolution of the European Council, supra note 118, § 2.3.
126. THE ECU, supra note 14, at 12; see Resolution of the European Council, supra note 118,

§ 2.3.
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mark has become the de facto anchor currency of the ECU, making Germany
the "point of orientation for monetary policy." 27 The development of the German
currency as the anchor has enabled EEC Member States with weaker currencies
to import stability and increase credibility in their currencies through their partici128
pation in the EMS.
The ECU is not a goal in itself, but is a tool to aid in accomplishing the principal
goal of the EMS, establishing a region of stability among the EEC members'
currencies. 129 "This is accomplished through the operation of an exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) that consists of two principal instruments for monitoring exchange rate volatility-the parity grid, and the divergence indicator.' 131 This
mechanism contains two components.' 3' The first mechanism is grounded on
what is called the concept of bilateral parties. 3 2 Under this concept rates are set
as bilateral central rates between currencies of each of the states participating,
around which bilateral limits of fluctuation are established and maintained with
the use of compulsory and unlimited intervention on the foreign exchange market. 133The second mechanism is based on what is called the divergence indicator. 34 The EEC created this indicator in order to establish a presumption of
action by the appropriate body in charge of the currency of the Member State's
government whose exchange rate fluctuation exceeds the EEC's limits."'
127. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 6.
128. Id. Germany was initially reluctant to allow its currency to adopt the paramount role of
anchor currency for the EMS because of the risks posed to their nationalistic monetary policies. Id.
The
German authorities viewed the accumulation of large Deutche mark holdings by other governments as
a threat to German monetary policy autonomy. Id.
129. Zamora, supra note 40, at 459.
130. Id.
131. VAN YPERSELE, supra note 28, at 50.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
All the EEC currencies . . . have an ECU-related central rate . . .The ECU-related
central rates are expressed as a certain quantity of currency per ECU . . .By linking
together the ECU-related central rates we obtain for each currency participating in
the EMS a series of bilateral central rates, the juxtaposition of which constitutes the
parity grid. Central rates can be changed by common consent, following a procedure
in which all the countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism are involved,
along with the Commission.
Id. at 50-52.
One of the new elements of the EMS that makes it different from the snake, which
was based only on the parity grid, is the divergence indicator. This device makes it
possible to locate the position and movement of an EMS currency relative to the
Community average represented by the ECU.
To do so, one calculates first the maximum divergence spread for each currency.
This spread represents the maximum percentage appreciation or depreciation which
the market rate of the ECU in terms of a given currency may show against its central
rate. It will be reached when the rate of this currency deviates by 2.25% in the same
direction from all the other EMS currencies .. ..
The divergence indicator shows the extent to which a given currency is nearing its
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Each country participating in the EMS is required to establish a central currency
rate for its currency in terms of the ECU.' 36 "This central rate becomes the
lynch-pin in assessing whether bilateral rates (exchange rates between pairs of
37
ERM-participating currencies) fall within the margins prescribed by the EMS." 1
This rate, when put in a matrix with the rates from other EMS members, forms
a grid of exchange rates known as the parity grid. 38 The maximum deviation of
a participating currency from the parity grid rate is 2.25 percent above or below
the average rate as represented by the ECU. 39 Members of the EMS agreement
that did not participate in the "snake" were initially allowed a greater margin
of deviation from the parity grid rate.'40 "Deviations outside of the parity grid are
to be avoided through a process of coordinated intervention in foreign exchange
markets, which is undertaken by central banks that purchase and sell the appropriate currencies." ''
The primary use of the ECU as a financing mechanism becomes important as
a source of funding for the necessary intervention. 42 The parity grid thus requires
EMS participants to maintain a band of stable exchange rates vis-A-vis each other,
and the EMS assists in the maintenance by providing a short-term source of funds
for intervention. 43 The divergence indicator is designed to maintain stability of
another sort; it is designed to measure EMS Member States' currencies' exchange
rates versus the ECU basket as a whole.'" The ERM has established a threshold
spread of divergence that is 75 percent of the maximum spread. 4' Attaining the
threshold spread requires the participating EMS member to take corrective policy
measures in order to stabilize their currency and prevent further divergence of
the exchange rate. '46 "Intervention in participating currencies is compulsory when
the intervention points defined by the fluctuation margins are reached." 141 "When
a currency crosses its 'threshold of divergence' this results in a presumption
that the authorities will correct this situation by adequate measures, namely: (1)
diversified intervention, (2) measures of domestic monetary policy, (3) changes
maximum spread. This is done by relating the premium or the discount, in the market
rate of the ECU in terms of that currency, to the above-mentioned maximum spread.
This ratio, expressed in percent, is the divergence indicator. When it reaches 75%,
the implicated currency is said to be at its divergence threshold.
Id. at 53.
136. Zamora, supra note 40, at 459.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; Resolution of the European Council, supra note 118, § 3.1.
140. Zamora, supra note 40, at 459.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 461.
143. See generally supra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
144. Zamora, supra note 40, at 459-60.
145. Id. at 460; see also Resolution of the European Council, supra note 118, § 3.5.
146. Zamora, supra note 40, at 460; see also Resolution of the European Council supra note
118, § 3.5.
147. Resolution of the European Council, supra note 118, § 3.4.
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in central rates, and (4) other measures of economic policy.',' 4 In the context
of the EMS system described above, the ECU serves three principal functions
in the EEC: (1) it is the principal accounting unit among members of the EMS;
(2) it serves as a means of settlement under49EMF financing facilities; and (3) it
is the common denominator of the ERM.1
B.

PROGRESS TOWARDS CURRENCY UNIFICATION

As described above, since its inception in 1979, the EMS has achieved some
success. 5 0 But just how much progress has occurred and in what areas? During
the period between 1957 and 1972 the economic, monetary, and fiscal policies
employed by the EMS members were highly divergent."'5 These divergences in
policy led to the collapse of the previous stability system, the Bretton-Woods
Agreement. 152 Despite the creation of the EMS, fiscal policy divergence among
the EEC members continues even now. 153 High governmental budget deficits in
ERM countries accompanied marked differences in fiscal performance among
the group stretching from double-digit deficits in Italy to huge surpluses in Den54
mark. 1
The EMS is designed to avoid some of these pitfalls. 155 Indeed it has achieved
some success. 156 The EMS members agreed to the first of the three stages of the
unification process, the creation of the ERM, in 1990. '7The first stage involves
participation in the ERM by all Member States. 158 This stage has already begun
to yield benefits. 59 These benefits include exchange rate stability for Member
States' currencies and price stability throughout the EEC. '6 Participation in the
ERM by the Member States also implies that, so long as realignment of the basket
is not adopted, one of the main costs of creating a single currency, loss of the
policy mechanism of exchange rate adjustment, is already being paid.161
The second stage, creating a system of European central banks to run the

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. § 3.6.
Zamora, supra note 40, at 460.
See generally supra notes 114-49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

152.

VAN YPERSELE,

supra note 28, at 66.

153. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 31.
154. Id.

155. See generally EMERSON, supra note 61;

VAN YPERSELE,

supra note 28;

UNGERER,

supra

note 13.
156. See generally THE ECU, supra note 14.

157.

EMERSON,

supra note 61, at 6.

158. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

159.

EMERSON,

supra note 61, at 131.

160. Id.
161. Id. The loss of this policy mechanism causes inflexibility in the EEC Member States' ability
to react to changes in economic outlook. Dassesse, supra note 19, at 390.
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EMU, officially began in November 1993.162 A review of the move to the third
stage is set to take place no later than 1997.163 All members of the EEC except
the United Kingdom have agreed to this review.'64 To date, the EMS seems to
have garnered a modicum of support throughout the EEC and has achieved a
broader success in a much shorter period
of time than the Bretton-Woods
65
Agreement was ever able to accomplish.1
Acceptance by the governments that have expended a huge amount of political time and clout in order to develop the EMS is unremarkable. But how
166
have the private markets reacted to the system and the ECU in particular?
Although private goods markets have not yet accepted the ECU as a hard
currency for private trade, a private market for the ECU has developed to the
point that soon it may dwarf the public use of the currency. 167 The first public
uses for the ECU were primarily in the area of ECU denominated bonds that
were floated by public utility companies such as STET, the Italian public
telecommunications company. 168 In addition, more than 200 banks throughout
Europe accept deposits in ECUs.1 69 Many banks also participate in an ECU
clearing mechanism for transactions between banks in the EEC. 1 oA few banks
even issue ECU-denominated certificates of deposit. 7' The EEC also decided
in 1984 to issue ECU credit cards and travelers checks.' 72 This swift growth
of a private market for the ECU reflects the public's desire for a true common
European currency.' 73 Thus, while the governments participating in the EMS
may move slowly and cautiously in an effort to maintain stability, the private

162. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 4A, 1992 O.J. (C 224).
Stage two will involve the slow but progressive narrowing of exchange rate fluctuation bands from
the current 2.25% to as close to zero as possible and will allow any significant divergence from
target values only for exceptional circumstances. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 17.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
166. See generally THE ECU, supra note 14; EMERSON, supra note 61; VAN YPERSELE, supra
note 28; UNGERER, supra note 13.
167. VAN YPERSELE, supra note 28, at 93. "Privately, the ECU is used in particular for: (i)
public issues of bonds, (ii) bank loans and deposits, (iii) the interbank market, [and] (iv) commercial
transactions." Id.
168. Id. The response to the issue of bonds from STET was so tremendous that the telecommunications company was forced to raise the amount of the issue from 25 to 35 million ECU in order to
satisfy the demand. Id. Since the STET issue, the number of issues has grown at an ever-increasing
pace, up to 100 for a total of seven billion ECU by mid-1984. Id.
169. Id. at 94.
170. Id.
171. Id. Corporations have also quickly developed a high degree of attraction to use the ECU to
cover against exchange rate risk in almost every type of international trade and business within the
EEC. Id.
172. Id. at 95.
173. Id. The ECU is now quoted on a growing number of stock exchanges including the Paris
and Brussels Stock Exchanges (where it is quoted officially) and in Milan and Rome (where it is
quoted unofficially). Id.
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markets have been overwhelming
in their acceptance of the ECU both concep74
tually and functionally. 1
Nevertheless, acceptance is not everything. Another important requirement
for success is for the governments involved to develop strong enough support
to ensure continued progress towards complete unification. From the phenomenal
acceptance of the ECU, it might appear at first that the underlying governmental
support is strong. However, a basic difference in approach to monetary integration
among the EEC members may well keep unification from happening. 175 This
difference in approach presents the EMS with a kind of chicken and egg paradoxwhether creating the institutions will bring about monetary policy unification or
76
whether monetary policy unification will bring about the necessary institutions. 1
This difference in approach is not new, having dominated debates on monetary
77
integration since the 1960s.1
One group, led by the Bundesbank, argues that monetary union should be the
"coordination" of a long process of economic integration and macroeconomic
convergence gradually aligning the countries with high inflation and profligate
policies to the countries with low inflation and prudent fiscal policies. 78 The
other group, led by the French Government, argues instead that monetary union
is an instrument for achieving convergence, and therefore, a monetary union can
be created before convergence has been achieved. 179 Furthermore, this group
regards monetary union and economic integration as interactive processes that
should proceed in parallel. 80
These basic differences in approach demonstrate one of the reasons why commitment to the ECU was less than complete initially and why any future agreement
will do little to strengthen it. '' Therefore, while the ECU may have wide public
support as a trade simplifier, any further progress is in jeopardy so long as the
82
EMS Member States cannot agree on the fundamental notion of how to proceed.
174. See generally supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.

175.

UNGERER,

supra note 13, at 39.

It has often been cast in terms of a debate between the "monetarists" and "economists'--those who favor strong reliance on the building of institutional monetary
arrangements, and those who favor a gradual approach, with strong emphasis on
narrowing existing differences in economic policies and developments and, in the
longer run, also in basic economic and social conditions. The first group argued that
common objectives in the field of monetary policy can best and most rapidly be achieved
by introducing institutional commitments and constraints. The second held that a consensus has to be reached about economic policy priorities and a very high convergence
of economic performance achieved before moving to common institutional arrangements in the monetary field. Id.
176. See supra note 175.

177.
178.

UNGERER,

FRATIANNI,

supra note 13, at 39.
supra note 15, at 5.

179. Id.
180. Id.

181.

UNGERER,

supra note 13, at 7.

182. See generally supra note 176-81 and accompanying text.
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Acknowledging the differences of opinion within the EEC on how to proceed,
the next question is what effect those differences of opinion are already having
on the progress towards currency unification? To begin with, the EEC countries
have severely limited the role of the ECU as a reserve asset and means of settlement. 183 At the center of the lack of commitment by EMS members to the ECU,
and the reason that the United Kingdom did not participate in the ERM, is the
desire of members to maintain an independent monetary policy in order to prevent
high inflation and high interest rates. " Recent high inflation within the United
Kingdom is an additional reason why the United Kingdom has hesitated to fully
participate.' 85 For these reasons, the United Kingdom has considered a commitment to the ECU not only unnecessary but also undesirable. 86 "[T]he official
attitude to the EMU-shared by both Treasury and Bank of England officialsis one of skepticism. ",is7 This skepticism is not meant to indicate that the United
Kingdom is totally against the internal market program, including financial integration.188 To the contrary, for the United Kingdom, the accent would be on
allowing the single market program to lead the way while monetary union would
lag cautiously behind. 89
Since fiscal policy is only one piece of the policy jigsaw puzzle, the next
inquiry to make is whether the other policy areas are faring any better. To begin,
evidence on the economies of EMS members shows that divergence in monetary
policy among the members continues today. '90 The lack of a common policy is
demonstrated by the fact that "correlation of short-term interest rates in ERM
countries with rates in Germany, the anchor country, have been weaker in most
countries than would have been expected with a high degree of monetary conver-

183. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 7. A number of factors caused the limitations on the use of the
ECU. Id. First, the creation of the ECU was only temporary and was limited by the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). Id. Second, the agreement on ECU creation was subject to
regular reconfirmation. Id. Third, due to the lack of a market for its use as a currency, the ECU
could not be used directly for intervention to support exchange rates. Id. Fourth, the emphasis on
intramarginal intervention during the evolution of the EMS diminished the ECU's role. Id. Fifth,
official ECUs could only be used within the ERM context. Id. And sixth, central rates are determined
bilaterally and not by using the ECU as the starting point. Id.
184. Id. at4.
185. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 4.
186. Id. at 43.
187. Heidemarie C. Sherman, Conclusionsand Prospectsfor EMU, in MONETARY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE 1992 PROCESS 148, 161 (Heidemarie C. Sherman ed., 1990). The officials in the United
Kingdom share a strong feeling that euphoric and premature moves into a monetary union, such as
the quick adoption of a single currency, need to be avoided. Id.
188. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 43.
189. Sherman, supranote 187, at 161. While other countries may be leading the charge for quicker
acceptance of currency unification, domestic criticism in the United Kingdom for its cautious approach
is almost nonexistent. Id. Because of the lack of any criticism within the political landscape of the
United Kingdom, the current government in Britain is unlikely to commit to stages two or three of
the Delors Report soon, or even at all. Id.
190. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 30-31.
WINTER 1994

1058

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

gence. "'9' And although the Delors Report represents one of the most concrete

proposals on unification to date, not all countries agree with the report.' 92 "Great
Britain, in particular, is opposed to this idea and has developed its own proposal.
Britain's alternative, known as the 'hard ECU' proposal, sees no need to mandate
the acceptance of the ECU as the EEC's currency. -193The Delors Report recognizes the desire for political independence, but also recognizes that in order to
achieve a lasting union, independence of monetary policies must dramatically
decrease.' 94 The report identifies the need for convergence in at least four areas:
(1) inflation rates within the Member States, (2) unemployment rates within the
Member States, (3) budgetary policies, and (4) competition policies.' 95
While the Report encourages some autonomy among the Member States in
order to accomplish the desired convergence, the report favors the transfer of
power out of the Member States and into EEC institutions whenever the transfer
would benefit the development of the monetary union. 196 The Delors Report also
favors a single currency on the grounds that it will facilitate monetary management
within the EEC.197 At the 1990 EEC intergovernmental conference, the Delors
Report lost a significant amount of backing, while support for the more cautious
and slower developing United Kingdom proposal increased.' 98 Spain, France,
and Italy all added support to the British plan. '99Thus, coordination in monetary
policy seems to be falling prey to the same sense of protectionism that has inhibited
the development of a cohesive fiscal policy for the EEC. 2°°
Despite all of the discussions recognizing the need for increased coordination
of policies, Member States have apparently made little effort to coordinate. 2 °'
Fiscal imbalances and divergences in fiscal policy among the EMS members have

191. Id.at 31.
192. Shulman, supra note 4, at 391.
193. Id. Under the British proposal, the EEC would allow market forces, and not mandates, to
determine the acceptance of the ECU in the foreign exchange markets. Id. The British proposal
would also scrap the idea of a single ECB, in favor of another institution, called the European
Monetary Fund, that would operate alongside the EMS Member States' own central banks, thus
leaving some policy autonomy at the Member State level. Id. The British proposal also envisions
the ECU as merely a dual currency, available on demand in lieu of Member States' currencies. Id.
194. Id. at 407.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 408. The Delors Report further indicates a strong belief that a single currency would
also remove exchange rate uncertainties and reduce transaction costs arising from trade between
entities within different EMS Member States. Id.
198. Id. at 420. One of the reasons for the loss of support for the Delors Report was the awareness,
by Member States, of the persistent divergences in their respective economic performances and the
need for increased coordination before they proceeded further.
199. Id.
200. See generallysupra notes 191-99 and accompanying text; cf. notes 184-90 and accompanying
text.
201. DAVID FOLKERTS-LANDAU & DONALD J. MATHIESON, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS 4-5 (1989).
VOL. 28, NO. 4

CURRENCY UNIFICATION IN THE EEC

1059

not only continued, but in some cases have actually increased.2 °2 Contributing to
this inability of the EMS members to coordinate policy are the differences in
preferences about the balance of inflation and unemployment among the EMS
Member States.203 These preferential differences cut at the heart of any unification
plan and have the potential to make the introduction of a common currency
extraordinarily costly for all the economies involved. 2°4 Based on current economic and political conditions within the EEC, the large divergence in unemployment and inflation rates, and the difference of opinion on what the proper balance
is for those factors, the EEC is not currently suited for the adoption of a single
currency.2 5 In the context of the divergent economic situations and policy preferences that pervades the EEC, currency union is a desirable but distant goal. 23 6
Considering the massive reformation necessary in fiscal and monetary policy
and the lack of cooperation between EMS members in these areas so far, the
EEC appears unable to achieve enough convergence among its members to make
a unified currency possible.20 7
C.

BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CURRENCY UNIFICATION

The next step in this analysis is an investigation of the potential costs and
benefits of unification. First, the EEC has come to a general consensus on the
most appropriate economic and monetary policy for the EEC members. 20 8 "Exchange rate stability and price stability have become twin objectives. Realignments have been used to offset cost and price differentials but have been supported
by internal adjustment measures signaling the determination of the authorities
to make price stability the priority of economic policy." 2°9 The result has been
that "consensus on economic policy priorities, the increasing convergence of
key nominal variables, and the mostly successful management of exchange rates,
202. Id. at 4.
203. See generally PAUL DE GRAUWE, THE ECONOMICS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 13 (1992).
204. Id. As De Grauwe explains, the various combinations of choices of inflation rates balanced
with unemployment rates can be represented by a Phillips curve much like a supply and demand
curve. Id. If two countries such as Italy and Germany were to choose different preferences about
the combination of unemployment and inflation rates, whatever fixed exchange rate they have chosen
will be unsustainable to either one, the other, or both. Id. The cost of monetary union for the two
countries lies in the fact that if Italy and Germany want to keep the exchange rate fixed they will
have to choose another (less preferred) point on their Phillips curves, so that an equal rate of inflation
becomes possible. Italy might have to accept less inflation and more unemployment than it would
do otherwise, and Germany might have to accept more inflation and less unemployment. Id. at 13-15
(figure 1.4).
205. Shulman, supra note 4, at 421.
206. Sherman, supra note 187, at 41. Because unification seems to be a distant goal, proposals
such as the "Genscher Initiative," which call for the quick establishment of the ECB, can be viewed
as political attempts to use a common currency as a symbol to continue support for unification at
a time when the system of agreements may be on the verge of collapse. Id.
207. See generally supra notes 176-206.
208. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 5.
209. Id.
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intervention, and interest rate differentials go a long way toward explaining why
for more than three years . . . there was no general realignment of central rates
in the EMS." 210
In addition to the general requirements of policy coordination, the EEC has
advanced several goals of economic convergence, including improving living
and working conditions for people within the EEC Member States. t At least
within the EEC, unification is a positive sum game that all can win as opposed
to a zero sum game where gains by one come at a cost to another.212 One obvious
benefit is that currency unification can potentially eliminate the costs of currency
conversion.2" 3 The elimination of currency conversion costs has been estimated
to have the potential to save more than 15 billion ECU per year, which amounts
to approximately 0.4 percent of the EEC's annual GDP.21 4 Currency unification
could help to decrease transaction costs for all trading companies. 215 The impact
would be greatest for small and medium-sized trading companies where transaction costs are currently estimated at 15 percent, or more, of their profit.21 6 Currency unification could also help to alleviate the foreign exchange risk.21 7 Exchange-rate risk imposes one of the major obstacles to trade between EEC Member
States by increasing the costs of international goods transactions.2t 8
The EEC could also realize several other benefits from unification that are more
difficult to quantify. One is improvement of EEC policies in areas of EEC-wide
importance. 2 9 Another likely benefit is the reduction in uncertainty that investors
210. Id. at 6.
211. Id. at 22. In addition to fiscal policy convergence, economic convergence is also considered
necessary in the context of the EMS to establish stable exchange rates within the member countries.
Id.
212. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 168. The essence of this argument is that by creating a unified
and completely open trading block, including the use of a single currency for all trade, the benefits
that the Member States could achieve will far outweigh the costs of reduced or eliminated fiscal and
monetary policy flexibility. Id. However, it remains consistent with the concept of a positive sum
game to point out that some Member States will continue to argue for a greater share of the gains
that they expect by the redistribution of budget resources in their favor or through lower contributions.
Id.
213. Id. at 32.
214. Id. The gains mostly consist of financial gains from the disappearance of bank commissions
and the elimination of the spread that banks charge businesses on such transactions. Id. Thus the
logical question is whether the elimination of these costs is a true savings benefit or a mere redistribution
of wealth within the fixed economy. Corporations may also be able to save costs by eliminating the
treasury departments that they maintain in order to manage their own multiple currency transactions.
Id. The elimination of treasury departments, of course, implies a corresponding reduction of jobs
and increase in unemployment. The question again becomes whether these reductions are a real
benefit of the adoption of a single currency or a way of shifting dollars from the pockets of those
who used to work to the now defunct treasury departments to the pockets of their former employers.
Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 33.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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feel with respect to economic prospects.22 ° Such an easing of uncertainty has the
potential of lowering the risk premiums that firms have to pay in order to raise
capital and increase investment.221 Finally, reduced uncertainty could result in
sustained growth in income and a decrease in unemployment.222
Thus, the EEC must be aware of the possibility in the future of at least modest
benefits from currency unification. 223 But benefits standing alone do not tell the
entire story. In order for the EEC Member States to make a fully informed
and reasoned decision about the intelligence of adopting unification, they must
necessarily understand the costs involved. For the EEC Member States to adopt
a unified system would make no sense unless they believe the potential benefits
outweigh the potential costs.
While currency unification may potentially have many benefits, "[t]here is
no categorical or unconditional reason to conclude that a monetary union is
preferable to a flexible exchange regime." 22 4 Some opponents of the ECU-based
system have expressed a fear "that the greater symmetry implied by such a system
would have inflationary consequences, since it allows for the possibility that a
strong currency could diverge owing to the simple fact that the combined weight
of weaker currencies might become dominant in the basket., 22 5 Thus, a strong
currency could reach its divergence limit before the weak currency and force its
country to intervene and endure accelerated inflation, thus financing the weak
currency country's lower inflation.226
While the EEC Member States might begin to realize some of the benefits
mentioned above at the inception of the EMS, they will only achieve the full
benefits of the union in the final stage. 227 Thus, the problem comes not in receiving
the benefits, but in achieving the final stage where the Member States can truly
realize the benefits. 28 Motivation to continue on the path to unification is likely
220. Id.
221. Id. "Preliminary estimates show that even a reduction in the risk premium of only 0.5
percentage points could raise income in the Community significantly, possibly by as much as 5 to
10 per cent in the long run." Id.
222. Id.
223. See generally supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
224. FRATIANNI, supra note 15, at 4.

On one hand, a monetary union eliminates exchange-rate flexibility and the attendant
degrees of freedom economies enjoy in coping with supply and demand shocks. Because
certain shocks are better handled with a common monetary policy while others are
better handled with independent national monetary policies, the preferability of a
unified option depends critically on the nature and the mix of the shocks to which the
participating countries are exposed. On the other hand, a common monetary policywhich is a direct implication of a monetary union-can be seen as a collusive agreement
among multinational banks with the intent of raising the benefits of inflation. Collusion
by central banks damages the discipline imposed on them by competitive monetary
policies and leads to higher inflation. Id.
225. VAN YPERSELE, supra note 28, at 49.

226. Id.
227. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 131.
228. See generally supra notes 176-207 and accompanying text.
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to wane when it becomes apparent to the members of the EMS that the savings
from transaction costs alone, which constitute much of the benefits that will be
achieved during the transition period, will be too small to justify unification.229
The reason is that European mobility "is relatively low even within nations using
the same language, let alone across language barriers." 230 Finally, movement
toward a single currency limits the fiscal policy options of the EEC Member
States and essentially handcuffs them in their attempts to react to supply and
demand shocks in their own economies.23' Currency unification will also result
in the loss to the EMS Member States of an important policy instrument, namely
the ability to control national currency in order to exert influence over the national
economy.232 When the internal market becomes imbalanced, the likely result for
the EEC is that the costs associated with reestablishing an equilibrium in domestic
and trade accounts will be less under a policy of currency devaluation than the
cost of using the exchange rate mechanism in order to accomplish the same
goal.233 Losing control over monetary policy can have harsh effects on a country's
economy. 234 Exchange rate flexibility allows a country, at least in the short run,
to choose inflation rates in order to help control the rate of unemployment.235
III. Conclusion
A.

REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS

Understanding the potential cost/benefit relationship of the EMS leads to several conclusions about the potential for success in unifying currencies. First,
however, what are the requirements for successful integration? Successful unification requires high coordination in three areas.236 The first area for coordination
229. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 12-13.

230. Id.
231. Dassesse, supra note 19, at 390. The move to a single currency imposes significant limitations
on the ability of Member States to finance deficits. Id. The move toward a single currency throughout
the EEC implies that not only can the individual Member States not finance their deficits through
borrowing from their national central bank, but they also cannot finance their deficits by obligating
their national banks, insurance companies, and similar institutions to purchase government bonds.
Id.
232. DE GRAUWE, supra note 203, at 42.

233. Id. Several EMS members have achieved some noteworthy cases of successful currency
devaluations recently. Most notably, devaluations in France in 1982-1983 (which France used as a
correction for a long period of major policy errors) and the Netherlands in 1982 were successful in
reestablishing domestic and trade equilibrium. Id. Neither devaluation caused significant increases
in unemployment in the local economies. Id.
234. Shulman, supra note 4, at 397-98.
235. David Laidler, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates in 1980, in EUROPEAN MONETARY
UNION: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 152, 155 (M. T. Sumner & G. Zis eds., 1982).
236. Joseph S. Nye, The PoliticalContext, in EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 40-41. "[S]uccessful progress to eventual monetary

and economic union will require a move from attempted coordination to a unification of policies,
at least in key areas such as money creation, determination of exchange rates, and pooling of reserves.
Bloomfield, supra note 1, at 25.
VOL. 28, NO. 4

CURRENCY UNIFICATION IN THE EEC

1063

is in the creation of institutions to organize and run the union.2 37 "Institutional
integration is the creation and development of common institutions. This dimension is measurable in terms of the respective jurisdictions and budgetary resources
of the institutions involved." 2 38 The second area of coordination is in both fiscal
and monetary policy making.239 Policy integration is the extent to which a set
of countries act as a group in making policy decisions. This "political division
of labor" is measurable by a locus-of-decision scale ranging from totally national
to totally communal. 24° The third area requiring coordination among the EMS
members is the moderation of attitudes toward obligations to the EEC.2 41 "Attitudinal integration is the extent to which people develop a sense of common identity
2 42
and mutual obligation. This can be measured by survey research data."
The need for common monetary policy and monetary union go hand-in-hand;
one cannot succeed without the other.2 43 The implementation of the internal market
program will have to be supported by a common monetary policy and monetary
union. 244 The optimal results of the internal market can only be achieved if the
monetary arrangements for the EEC were to minimize, if not eliminate, the
uncertainties resulting from independent national monetary policies and from
exchange rates subject to adjustments and fluctuations. 245 The argument can be
summed up under the dictum of the "inconsistent quartet," that is, the incompatibility of free trade, full capital mobility, fixed
exchange rates, and national auton246
omy in the conduct of monetary policy.
The EMS requires a high degree of policy consistency and compatibility among
the Member States for the EEC to avert disruptions in internal markets and
pronounced regional imbalances. 247 The Delors Report recognizes that in order
to achieve the goal of free circulation of capital and integrated financial markets
among the EEC countries, "member states' economic and monetary policies
need to be more closely coordinated; this includes, but is not limited to, convergent
inflation and unemployment rates and similar budgetary and competition policies. ,248 No matter what decisions are made with respect to fiscal and monetary
237. Nye, supra note 236, at 40.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 41.
242. Id. The three aspects of political integration change at different rates: some progress faster
than others. Id. The leads and lags between the aspects are of great importance because successful
and stable long-run integration requires high degrees of integration among all aspects. Id.
243. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 38.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Shulman, supra note 4, at 407. The obvious result of such broad policy and economic
coordination is that the EEC Member States will become increasingly interdependent both financially
and politically. Id.
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policy within the EMS, unification of purpose and policy are vital to the success
of the agreement.
If policy coordination were the end-all for unification, then it might be possible
for the EMS members to agree on a successful solution. However, a number of
other problems are holding up the development of a unified currency. A second
prerequisite for moving to a single currency is a stable exchange rate.2 49 A stable
exchange rate in turn requires convergence of costs and prices in goods since
differences in inflation rates of traded goods will disrupt the balance of trade
between high inflation and low inflation countries, thereby causing an imbalance
of payments. 250 However, while cost and price convergence is a prerequisite to
achieving lasting stability, it is insufficient on its own to achieve the desired
result.25' In order to achieve and sustain stability throughout the EEC, the EEC
members' disparate macroeconomic policies must converge. 252 A necessary precondition for achieving convergence in prices and costs is the requirement for
wage-rate change coordination since wages are in large part responsible for the
determination of prices and costs of goods.2 53 Wage-rate control, in turn, will
require a change in public attitude throughout the EEC, since the changing of
wage-rate growth will ultimately result in some countries living with more inflation than they would prefer and others enduring more unemployment than they
feel is acceptable.254 Thus, the concept of discipline in the areas of costs, prices,
and wages constitutes another of the important requirements for the success of
unification.255
Economic integration alone will not bring about monetary union without a
concurrent move toward political union.256 This political leap will only come
about once each EEC Member State government believes that a European monetary union will aid it in achieving other political goals.257 One of the primary
political leaps necessary for the success of any lasting economic union is in
formation of a unified strategy. 258 However, strategy coordination will not be
sufficient; unification of strategy through centralization of the decision-making
process is necessary for the success of a European monetary union.259
Eventually, economic integration will require a major transfer of economic
249.

UNGERER,

supra note 13, at 22.

250. Id.
251. Id. at 23.
252. Id.

253. W. Max Corden, The Adjustment Problem, in EUROPEAN
MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES,

MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS

supra note 1, at 164-65.

254. Id.
255. See generally supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
256. Sherman, supra note 187, at 157.
257. Id. Currently, the German, Dutch, French, and British Governments' views on monetary
union are significantly different. Id. at 157-60.
258. Theo Peeters, EMU: Prospectsand Retrospects, in EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION: PROGRESS
AND PROSPECTS, supra note 235, at 15.
259. Id.
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sovereignty to new EEC institutions capable of exercising that power." ° Because
unification requires the abdication of substantial political power by all participating members of the EMS, continued progress toward unification requires political
and economic will rather than enforceable laws.26' In all, the success of currency
unification and the EMU requires political feasibility and economic viability.2 62
Both requirements suggest that gradualism is a key factor in any approach.263 In
terms of pure politics, the argument is that, except for a major crisis such as a
war, it is impossible to generate the political support necessary to bring about
rapid currency unification. 26 "Even the most devoted European among the political leaders of our Member States would prefer a transition process that would
allow for gradual adjustments of institutional structures and a slow erosion, at
265
least formally, of national sovereignty.Thus, the correction of a sustainable union will involve a number of distinct
elements. These elements will include fiscal and monetary policy coordination;
coordination of wage, price, and cost adjustments; attitudinal modification; and
political power sharing. 2
B.

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

In light of the costs, benefits, and requirements associated with unification,
the adoption of a common currency will likely lead to one of three possible
outcomes for the EEC.267 First, the attempt at European monetary union may
turn out to be nothing more than a futile gesture.268 Second, the EEC may achieve
enough success in the first step to create a genuine European currency.2 69 Third,
European countries may accomplish no more than succeeding in narrowing exchange rate bands.27 °
By understanding these possibilities, the EEC should be able to choose the
best plan to achieve the greatest success. It may be possible to use integration

260. Denis Lamb, ECProject1992: The Dynamics of Change, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1989, at
31, 34. "The contemplation of this prospect accounts for much of the increasing attention being
paid to eventually setting up a European central bank and establishing a single European currency.
For the moment, however, what seems sensible and appealing to European policy-makers is a steady
development of what exists." Id.
261. Shulman, supra note 4, at 398.
262. Peeters, supra note 258, at 9.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See generally supra notes 237-65 and accompanying text.
267. Harry G. Johnson, Narrowingthe Exchange Rate Bands, in EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 80.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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in one of the areas in order to create integration in another.2 7 The key to this
strategy is to find sectors with which to begin the transformation that are noncontroversial but politically symbolic and sufficiently insulated from other, more
controversial sectors.2 72 However, the fact is that objectives among the EEC
members conflict with respect to the underlying political purpose of monetary
unification.273 The EEC members continue to maintain conflicting objectives with
respect not only to the political purpose of unification, but also toward the steps
that should be taken to achieve it.2 74 This divergence of objectives
is demonstrated
2 75
in the lack of coordination in monetary and fiscal policy.
Whether these differences in policy judgments and preferences make any practical difference is difficult to determine. One possibility is that the EEC Member
States have not learned from the failure of the Bretton-Woods Agreement that
proprietary policy determinations will only lead to a collapse of the system.
Apparently they have not. For example, in direct confrontation with what the
EEC requires for unification, Member States "have held firmly to their autonomy
in decision making on domestic monetary and economic policies, relying on their
right to alter exchange rates or to impose safeguard measures if need be in case
of balance-of-payments problems.' 2 76 In addition to differences in basic policy
objectives, the history of attempts at cooperation among the European countries,
including the Bretton-Woods Agreement, demonstrates that crisis in monetary
situations fosters dissent and division in implementing external monetary policy. 277 Thus, the potential remains high for encountering the fiscal and monetary
policy conflicts that have pervaded past relationships among EEC members and
that endanger the future stability of the system.278 These conflicts will potentially
lead to fiscal imbalances that will undermine market stability. 279 These imbalances
could also lead to unemployment spiralling out of control as low-inflation countries are forced to import inflation from the high-inflation countries in order to
retain some semblance of stability in the system.28°

271. Nye, supra note 236, at 45. "The Monnet, or neofunctionalist, method that has characterized
the European Community was to avoid frontal clashes over sovereignty, and rather to let the natural
linkages inherent in complex societies draw political actors gradually from integration in one sector
to integration in another." Id.
272. Id. "Monetary policy has the advantage of political symbolism without rousing intense
nationalist feelings." Id.
273. Johnson, supra note 267, at 79; see also supra notes 176-207 and accompanying text.
274. Id.
275. Bloomfield, supra note 1,at 24. Germany, for example, places much more importance than
France upon restraining inflation as opposed to reducing unemployment. Policy preferences and
instruments tend to differ from country to country as does the relative effectiveness of those policy
choices. Id.
276. Id. at 24-25.
277. Id. at 23.

278.

UNGERER,

supra note 13, at 23.

279. Id.
280. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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The possibility remains that either all of the obstacles will be overcome and
unification will take place, or some of the requirements will be ignored and
unification will proceed despite this deficiency. In either case, it is important to
question the impact that policy divergence will have on Member States once
currency unification has taken place. Moving to a single currency implies that
countries cannot use exchange rates to fix imbalances.281 External account imbalances are likely to the extent that cost and price convergence cannot be achieved.2"2
The existence of a single currency will prevent the effects of the divergences
from being offset by exchange rate adjustments.283 Thus, when imbalances occur
within an EMS Member State's economy, the Member State will suffer losses
in order to compensate.2 84 In addition to uncontrollable fiscal imbalances, parallel
advancement of economic and monetary policy could result in spreading high
unemployment and inflation throughout the entire EEC.28 5 These potential results
demonstrate "the Delors Report's rigid and often unrealistic approach." 28 6 Because countries will lose control of their domestic monetary policy to a centralized
body within the EEC, the fixed exchange rate regime will cause countries with
higher inflation to export their inflation to countries with lower inflation.287 Member States are likely to succumb to the export/import of inflation because the
decrease in demand likely to occur from the increased inflation will cause increased unemployment.28 8 High unemployment, in turn,
will cause an increase
289
in inflation in other countries in order to correct it.
281. Shulman, supra note 4, at 409.
282. UNGERER, supra note 13, at 24.
283. Id.
284. Corden, supra note 253, at 163.
Internal balance can be thought of as the combination of unemployment and inflation
that a specific country prefers from an internal point of view, given the various combinations it can choose from at any particular point in time. To take the hypothetical case:
In a world of at least three countries where fiscal and monetary policies in each
country are used to maintain internal balance, country A may need to depreciate and
country B to appreciate relative to the outside world, if each is to maintain internal
and external balance. However, if A and B form exchange rate union, they can jointly
depreciate, which would suit A, or jointly appreciate, which would suit B. But they
cannot alter the exchange rate to suit both. If the exchange rate adjustment leaves
country A with a deficit, A will have to deflate, hence creating unemployment. If the
adjustment leaves country B with a surplus, B will either have to be content with
accumulating reserves or allow its wages and prices to rise.
Id. at 162.
285. Shulman, supra note 4, at 409.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 400.
288. DE GRAUWE, supra note 203, at 10.
289. Id. Using France and Germany as examples, if France were to relinquish control over its
exchange rate by creating a monetary union with Germany, it would be saddled with sustained
unemployment and a current account deficit. Id. That deficit could only disappear by deflation in
France. Id. Essentially, France would feel the costs of a monetary union through a negative demand
shock. Id. In the same way, Germany's cost of participation in the monetary union with France
would be the need to accept more inflation than it would prefer. Id.
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In addition to the Member States' loss of ability to correct inflation and unemployment imbalances, "[m]onetary union destroys the discipline of policy competition and thereby worsens the quality of the product-that is, it results in higher
average inflation." 29 Finally, countries have different optimal inflation rates.29
The countries that currently maintain underdeveloped tax systems will tend to
find inflation the most advantageous method of raising revenue, because the
marginal cost of inflation will be less than the marginal cost of increasing taxes.292
In the end, the advantages cannot outweigh the large-scale unemployment likely
to result from unification.293
In addition to the potentially destructive fiscal and economic policy implications, the EEC Member States are likely to face a number of other detrimental
possibilities. First, the initiative will likely invalidate a number of bilateral treaties
between the United States and the EEC Member States. 21 "[F]riendship, commerce, and navigation treaties will have to be replaced, or the United States
from discrimination. Aviation treaties will also have to be
will not be protected
295
renegotiated.' ,
Second, differences in labor markets, especially wages, will increase the cost
of unification because they "lead to divergent wage and price developments,
even if countries face the same disturbances.' 296 Institutional differences in labor
markets are likely to continue long after the EEC has fully implemented currency
unification. 297 These differences may lead to wage and unemployment differences
and ultimately cause severe adjustment problems.29 8 Finally, from 1981-1990
the average yearly GDP growth rates of countries in the EEC ranged from a low
of 1.8 percent in the Netherlands to 2.9 percent in Spain. 299 These differences
in the natural growth rates of EEC Member States will lead to trade imbalances
and balance-of-payments problems that could cause the eventual destruction of
any union.3°
In the final analysis, economic reasoning will, as always, be subordinated to
290. FRATIANNI, supra note 15, at 164. "The theory of credibility implies that the trend inflation
rate increases with the short-run orientation of monetary policy. The conclusion is that central bank
independence is a prerequisite of price stability; indeed, the optimal monetary arrangement calls for
complete monetary independence." Id. at 165.
291. DE GRAUWE, supra note 203, at 28.
292. Id.
293. Corden, supra note 253, at 177. The problem posed is one of a balance between the potential
benefits from unification versus the costs; the benefits appear to be minimal as compared to the
drastic consequences that seem to be an almost inevitable result of the loss of control by EMS Member
States. Id.
294. EC Will Have Common Currency by 2000, Member of European Parliament Predicts, 6
INT'L TRADE REP.

(BNA) 240, 241-42 (1989).

295. Id. at 242.
296. DE GRAUWE, supra note 203, at 18.
297. Id. at 35.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 25.
300. Id.
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politics. 30' Currently, no political consensus exists in France, Italy, or the United
Kingdom toward currency unification, and no evidence exists to support the belief
that ideological differences within and among EEC members will disappear upon
joining a monetary union.3 2
It can, of course, be argued that governments behave the way they do merely because
they are too ... short-sighted to recognize how limited their real freedom of action
is. But even if that is true, there is no reason to believe that they will suddenly cease
being ... short-sighted merely because they have promised to behave more wisely in
the future. 3 3
Even if local governments relinquish power to an autonomous central bank,
the people will still blame them for unpopular fiscal policy. 304 For their own
political protection, the local governments will be forced to take back the power
that they relinquished .305 Flexible exchange rates are thus a reflection of the state
autonomy necessary to control both local economies and the political realities
of the situation.3 06 "Only a flexible-exchange-rate regime permits each country
to choose its own degree of monetary discipline independently of choices made
by others. 3 7 In the final analysis, economic union requires monetary union for
success, and the only way to achieve true monetary union is through political
union.30 8 "And political union requires a different institutional structure, not
merely when it has been achieved but as a condition to achieving it.309
Unless a more flexible approach is adopted, prospects are not good for success
of the EMU. 3 10 "If the political priority given to EMU remains low in two or
more of the larger Member States, then little further movement can be expected. -311 Because of the lack of institutional development at present, if political
momentum begins to shift toward the EMU, the strain of integrating the higherinflation countries is likely to overwhelm the current institutions.312 Currently,
growth rates among member countries and inflation rates in those countries are
significantly disparate. 313 Thus, at the current point of evolution of the EMS a
direct move to a system of fixed exchange rates could be disastrous for the EEC

301. Norbert Walter, The EMS: Performanceand Prospects, in
235, at 62.

EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION:

PRoGRESS AND PROSPECTS, supra note

302. David Marquand, EMU: the Political Implications, in EUROPEAN MONETARY
supra note 235, at 239.
303. Id. at 238.
304. Id. at 239.
305. Id.
306. Laidler, supra note 235, at 166.
307. Id.
308. Marquand, supra note 235, at 247.
309. Id.
310. Sherman, supra note 187, at 163.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Shulman, supra note 4, at 401-02.
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Member States. 314 The current development of political institutions for running
the EMU is almost nonexistent and is unlikely to survive the political strains that
are likely to emerge. 315 Thus, skepticism about the likelihood of progress is
justified. 1 6
C.

ALTERNATIVES

Considering the preceding discussion, EEC Member States would do well to
put their greatest effort toward solutions that will not become embroiled in the
politics that are destined to destroy even the most successful agreements. Until
the EEC is willing to have supranational elections for EEC political positions,
the idea of relinquishing political power to an "independent" foreign body is
likely to provoke a strong public reaction.3"7 Thus any solution attempting to
develop greater economic unity among the EEC members will have to avoid this
type of power delegation.
One example of how greater economic unity might be accomplished is through
commercial joint efforts such as the Chunnel, the Airbus, or European Economic
Interest Groupings.3"' This type of international cooperation helps to build a
manufacturing base within the entire region that would not be possible for the
participating countries acting independently.3"9 These cooperative ventures may
also help to coordinate economic policies in the participating countries by integrating the participants' economies.320 For example, if the economy worsens for
a particular product, the affected countries must react with similar fiscal and
economic policies in order to rectify the situation.3 2' This interaction would also
allow for the tailored use of economic and fiscal policy within each country that
is necessary because of the inherent differences in each member's economy.322
Even this type of cooperative solution will not prevent the inevitable economic
downturns and upturns. In the end, however, it may prove more palatable than
the alternative of states relinquishing their only power to control their economic
323
situations: fiscal and economic policy.

314. Id. at 402.
315. Marquand, supra note 235, at 244.
316. Johnson, supra note 267, at 79. "One can argue that the Europeans have become accustomed
to making gestures toward integration as a fair-weather system while retaining autonomy of domestic
economic policy ..... Id.
317. Sherman, supra note 187, at 157.
318. See Johan de Bruycker, EC Company Law-The European Company v. The European Economic Interest Grouping and the Harmonization of the National Company Laws, 21 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 191, 215 (1991).
319. Id. at 197.
320. Id. at 216.
321. Shulman, supra note 4, at 407.
322. See DE GRAUWE, supra note 203, at 13.
323. See id. at 42.
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